Will Tokenisation of the Economy Change the Foundations of Trust in Transactions? Selected Issues in the Context of Decentralised Public Blockchain Networks

Mateusz Aleksander Bonca

Abstract

This paper establishes that the use of emerging decentralised public blockchain networks results in a shift in the approach to trust in transactions, with the following factors shaping trust in blockchain transactions identified and analysed: (a) technological, (b) economic, (c) political, (d) legal, and (e) socio-psychological. It was determined that the sources of trust in blockchain transactions have transformed, with new elements emerging: trust in technology, social trust, self-trust, and trust in ‘hidden’ intermediaries. These non-technological factors, analysed in more detail, can be both catalysts for trust in blockchain transactions, as well as barriers. The final conclusions include a catalogue of political, legal and social actions that should be taken to increase trust in decentralised blockchain transactions.

Keywords: decentralised public blockchain, token, trust, tokenisation of the economy, politics and blockchain, law and blockchain, social phenomena and blockchain

Introduction

Trust is fundamental to shaping a sustainable economy, stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship. Trust in economic transactions is a positive expectation that a partner will meet agreed-upon conditions by acting honestly, transparently and predictably towards the other party. Trust in each other allows parties to cooperate even in conditions of uncertainty, reducing the need for constant external oversight and ongoing transaction monitoring.

In recent years, the technological revolution has revealed entirely new trust issues in economic transactions, with technological changes proving to be a catalyst for trust, but also representing a new risk factor (Edelman Trust Institute, 2024). A significant erosion of trust in public institutions has also been observed for several decades.¹ This erosion encompasses trust in the state itself, its individual bodies and procedures, including parliament, courts, notaries, banking supervision commissions, auditors, the legal system, and the banking system (e.g. Fukuyama, 1997; Lacity & Treiblmaier, 2022; Swan, 2020; Szpringer, 2022; Sztompka, 2007; Verhoest et al., 2024).²

New problems have emerged, since trust in economic relations on a decentralised public blockchain is based on an original and new philosophy of security and credibility. It is based on cryptography, consensus mechanism and full transparency (e.g. Beck et al., 2016; Bielecki, 2020; Budish, 2025; de Filippi et al., 2025; Shetty et al., 2022; Lacity & Treiblmaier, 2022; Lumineau et al., 2023; Oksanowicz, 2018; Piech, 2016; Piech, 2020; Szpringer, 2022; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2019), and it is assumed that trust is generated essentially without the intermediation and strict legal control of the state, banks and other entities (without a ‘third party’), i.e. without traditional public and private institutions confirming the credibility of transactions (Sztompka, 2007, p. 113).

This paper focuses on trust related to public, decentralised platforms, while trust in private and centralised networks is beyond the scope of this work, as they are based on slightly different sources. Trust in a centralised network is built through control, stemming from the position and credibility of the network operator, while a decentralised network does not have a single controlling entity.

The aim of this article is to outline the answers to the following questions: (1) Does the expected tokenisation of the economy based on decentralised blockchain networks significantly change the traditional foundations of trust in economic transactions? Or perhaps does it only shape more complex, multi-layered, and multi-entity forms of trust? (2) What real impact will (a) politics, (b) law, and (c) socio-psychological factors (social awareness), i.e. non-technological and non-economic factors, have (and already does have) on this trust? (3) Are they (will they be) catalysts or barriers to change? (4) What actions should political decision-making centres in countries take, how should the law be shaped, and how can social awareness be influenced so that these factors become catalysts of trust in the token economy and blockchain transactions?

For the purposes of this work, the following types of factors shaping trust in blockchain transactions were distinguished: (a) technological, (b) economic, (c) political, (d) legal, and (e) socio-psychological. The first two are internal in nature, in the sense that they are designed by blockchain creators, and are the subject of extensive literature and hence generally remain beyond the scope of this work (e.g. Beck et al., 2016; Bielecki, 2020; Budish, 2025; Buterin, 2015; de Filippi et al., 2025; Shetty et al., 2019 ; Lacity & Treiblmaier, 2022; Lumineau et al., 2023; Oksanowicz, 2018; Piech, 2016; Piech, 2020; Szpringer, 2022, Tapscott & Tapscott, D., 2019). However, since they co-create the environment of trust and are feedback-linked with other factors, several remarks were made at the beginning of the discussion.

The next three factors are external in nature, meaning that blockchain creators have no direct influence over them. These are political, legal, and socio-psychological factors – they are the subject of this work, directly and indirectly shaping technological freedom in practice. It is an idea that refers to the freedom to use technology without excessive political, legal and social constraints (Allen et al., 2020).

Therefore, the work assumes that trust should be analysed considering both the technological and the socio-political aspects together, i.e. the environment in which blockchain operates, as well as the interactions between technology and this environment, especially the user community.

Figure 1
Factors Inluencing Trust in Transactions on a Public, Decentralised Blockchain

Source: author's own work.

The article presents the following sections: (2) basic terminology and concepts of blockchain, characteristics of public and private blockchains, decentralised and centralised networks, the concept of tokens, smart contracts, as well as elementary findings regarding the concept of trust; (3) research methodology; (4) the influence of technological, economic, political, legal and other social factors on trust in blockchain transactions; and (5) conclusions and final reflections.

Decentralised and Centralised Blockchain, Public and Private, Token, Smart Contract and Trust

Decentralised and Centralised

Due to its management model (the architecture of the computer network), a blockchain can be decentralised or centralised. A fully decentralised blockchain is a distributed network, a database (open source) operating in a peer-to-peer architecture, and is considered one of the most groundbreaking technological innovations in the recent years. The database does not have a single, centralised node but is created and managed by computers connected to each other in the network. (Au & Power, 2018; Sharma et al., 2022; Swan, 2020; Szelągowska, 2022; Szostek, 2018; Szpringer, 2018; Szpringer, 2022). Blockchain stores information in blocks that are linked chronologically using cryptography, where each new block contains a link (hash) to the previous one. Such a blockchain is not centrally maintained, with the central maintenance replaced by operational rules. In this model, the foundation of trust is established by a chosen consensus method (e.g. Proof of Work, Proof of Stake, and others) and the decentralisation with thousands of nodes securing the network, with decentralised blockchains therefore lacking a single central governing body. The source code remains open, and data is immutable and accessible to its users.

The second model – centralized blockchain – remains outside the scope of this work. A centralized network is one in which all nodes send their data to a central point, which then sends the data to the appropriate nodes. Such platform also uses a block structure (a sequence of hashes, data immutability), but control over data recording rests with a single entity (a company, an industry consortium, a government, a limited number of selected users). Such a blockchain is not logically distributed, as decisions are centralised. Regular users can utilise mechanisms built on a given blockchain, but they have no influence on the management of functionalities or direct control over the mechanisms of the network. Therefore, the security and trust in such a solution are based on the quality (trustworthiness) of the entity overseeing and managing the network.

Public and Private

Blockchains are also divided into public and private based on their access model, based on different philosophies of building security and credibility (Buterin, 2015).

A public blockchain is open, accessible to anyone with Internet access, functioning as a network that requires no permissions. Any user can participate passively or actively in its construction, browse data, and take part in the process of transaction verification. Its main feature, therefore, is that anyone can download any fragment or the entire database and typically has the right to share their copy with other nodes. It is essentially anonymous.

A private blockchain is not accessible to everyone; users must be granted permission. It is controlled by a specific entity (person, organisation), and participants are transparent, authenticated and verified. A closed, cryptographically encrypted database is neither publicly transparent nor publicly accessible, and no outsiders can observe transactions unless they have permission. A private blockchain is especially used when the business network contains confidential data or when legal regulations prohibit individual members from using the public blockchain (Piech, 2016). Private blockchains are therefore beyond the scope of this work.

Both criteria (decentralised vs. centralised and private vs. public) can be combined, creating, for example, decentralised public blockchains (see Figure 2). An example of a decentralised and public blockchain is Ethereum.

Figure 2
Object of the Research: Blockchain

Source: author's own work.

There are also public, centralised blockchains (e.g. the Dubai Land Department - https://dubailand.gov.ae/en/ with its Dubai Real Estate Transaction Register, DLD); as well as private, centralised ones (e.g. attempts to build solutions for logistics companies to manage the dataflow about goods in transit) and private, decentralised ones, in which access to the network remains limited. These are managed by a distributed structure: decisions are made jointly in a consortium model, and no one has full control because there is no dominant entity (e.g. Corda (R3), a platform based on distributed ledger technology (DLT), designed specifically for financial services and based on the principles of privacy, security, and interoperability).

Hybrid solutions include both private blockchains, which can be largely decentralised (e.g. the Hyperledger Fabic consortium), or public blockchains, which have some centralisation features (e.g. Binance Smart Chain, BSC – anyone can use them, but Binance controls most nodes).

To recapitulate, this text focuses on trust issues in economic transactions on decentralised public blockchains only, while issues related to blockchain as an IT tool remain outside the scope of considerations, i.e. technology used almost exclusively as a database, a platform for recording facts and sharing data between trusted entities only, e.g. in logistics, banking and healthcare.

Token

A token is a cryptographic asset, a digital representation of value or rights, a specific sequence of characters representing specific data. As a digital unit of account stored in a distributed database, it is an abstract entity, a digital symbol, an avatar, and can refer to anything in the virtual or physical world. Modern digital tokens appeared in 2009 with the creation of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency (e.g. Bonca, 2024; Szpringer & Niewińska, 2021; Voshmgir, 2025; Włosik, 2021). Bitcoin, published as open-source code, quickly became the first digital asset of value. Tokenisation of financial assets, including stocks, bonds and stablecoins, is usually based on fungible tokens, each equivalent to any other token in the same series. There is no difference between them, so they can be freely exchanged. A defining characteristic of blockchain is that once data is entered into it, it is virtually indelible and immutable. “A secure protocol in which a network of computers collectively verifies a transaction before it is recorded and approved.” (Schwab, 2018, p. 36). The whole concept is based on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) as the foundation of tokenisation, i.e. creating tokens and assigning specific values to them (Au & Power, 2018; Lacity & Treiblmaier, 2022; Szelągowska, 2022; Voshmgir, 2025).

Smart Contracts

Blockchain functions as an infrastructure for smart contracts (Behan & Pecyna, 2020; Buterin, 2015; Kowacz & Wielgus, 2021; Szostek, 2021). A smart contract is a tool, an algorithmic code in a properly prepared computer programme based on data on a fully decentralised blockchain (e.g. Ethereum). It is a self-executing code that automatically performs, controls and documents actions according to previously established conditions, and changing the code's conditions is not possible once the smart contract has been entered into by parties on the blockchain. Therefore, an automatically approved transaction cannot, in principle, be reversed, changed or copied. As it is self-executing, the ‘contract’ is automatically fulfilled on the blockchain, without the need for the involvement of the state or any public authority (Mmereole, 2023; Voshmgir, 2025).

Trust

Gaining trust is traditionally crucial to the success of business transactions. The traditional foundations of any lasting business relationship are honesty and transparency, regularity and stability in decision-making and execution of actions.

I assume “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 26). Numerous scientific studies characterise trust as a multifaceted phenomenon (e.g. based on emotions or cognition), multilevel (e.g. interpersonal or interorganisational), cross-level (e.g. emerging between individuals and communities), and dynamic (e.g. rapid or based on the long shadow of the past) (Schilke et al., 2023). On the other hand, credibility is about meeting expectations or fulfilling obligations to those who have trusted us (Sztompka, 2007, p. 99).

Trust and credibility are the foundations of social capital (Sztompka, 2023), with public and institutional trust in the state, its bodies, agencies, regulations, operating procedures and the law being the foundation of a stable economic, political and social system, enabling cooperative behaviour (e.g. negotiations), lowering transaction costs, reducing corruption, promoting long-term investments, preventing abuse, and increasing social solidarity. A culture of credibility is supported by the coherence of the axiological order, institutions that set standards to ensure behavioural control and rule enforcement, and the sustainability of the social order (Sztompka, 2023, p. 184).

Trust in economic transactions is a positive expectation that a partner will fulfil previously agreed-upon conditions and act honestly and predictably towards the other party. Trust reduces transaction costs by decreasing the need for constant monitoring and control mechanisms by third parties. In traditional economic relations, the parties to a transaction trust each other based on previous positively assessed mutual contacts or on the reputation of the other party (Smits & Hulstijn, 2020). In most cases, trusted relationships are also complemented or replaced by institutional controls of third parties (i.e. control-based trust), such as courts, banks, notaries and specialised private agencies.

What new sources, if any, of legitimizing trust in economic transactions does the emerging economic power of distributed networks and tokens currently offer? Is this groundbreaking technology now the foundation of trust, meaning that users rely primarily on a mechanism that is designed to function according to their expectations, without considering who is behind it or who designed it? Does it matter to users who offers, installs and maintains the technology? What role in creating trust do companies offering tokenisation platforms, token issuers, and cryptocurrency exchanges play?

Does technology-based trust become the base for a new model of expectations that arise within the online community about the regular, honest and cooperative behaviour of its members? Or does it give rise to new mindsets and attitudes?

Generally speaking, the belief in fairness on a public blockchain is based – according to the assumptions of the technology creators – on the belief in a) fair transactions thanks to the adopted consensus mechanism; (b) the distributed community itself (the power of decentralisation); (c) the value of a public, distributed audit that can be performed by any user of a distributed network; (d) and, moreover, the importance of openness and transparency of the network and the certainty and self-executability of transactions thanks to smart contracts.

The belief in fairness on a private blockchain is based on belief in the operator's reputation, lack of anonymity, and reliance on regulations.

Honest users of new online platforms are generally optimistic and believe in the value of the blockchain economy, expressing this optimism through their activity on blockchains and their belief in the need to become part of a specific new platform as early as possible, benefitting from its development for example through profits from the increasing value of tokens. They often downplay transaction risks, including the fact that anonymous transactions, which are currently untraceable (or rather extremely difficult and costly to trace), can facilitate criminal activities (e.g. money laundering, terrorism financing, pyramid schemes). Since the 2008 financial crisis, criminals have been very interested in blockchain transactions since they had to escape from their previous relationships with banks, as the latter carefully sealed loopholes in their regulations.

Philosophers, economists, computer scientists, programmers and lawyers (recently, e.g. NASK, 2025; Toufaily & Zalan, 2024; Verhoest et al., 2024) alike focus and work on the concept of trust and security of the distributed ledger technology and tokens themselves. They can be divided into: (a) enthusiasts and optimists, (b) moderate, approving realists, (c) neutral recorders of the phenomenon, avoiding fundamental assessments, (d) those who believe that the phenomena will remain on the margins of the economy, and e) those who describe numerous threats and predict the decline of the token fad.

In business, assessments of the phenomenon and attitudes also vary significantly: from corporations undertaking serious research and tokenisation application work to companies ignoring this technological stream.

National policies and decisions by countries range from authorities banning activities in this area to cautious DeFi observers designing and establishing supervision mechanisms of varying scope, while many countries have also recognised the growing importance of the token economy and are attempting to organise legal oversight of the new branch of economy by developing relevant frameworks and risk management standards.

Methodological Notes

Social science research on the functions and conditions of blockchain and tokens is already quite advanced, with a rich international literature (e.g. Lewis, 2021; Voshmgir, 2025; Włosik, 2021). The issue is analysed from multiple perspectives, ranging from basic research to applied research aimed at developing new principles, structures and procedures for the planned global expansion of tokens in the economy. The results in this paper are based on secondary data from the fields of economics, cryptoeconomics, sociology, psychology and legal sciences.

Reasoning about the sources of trust in transactions on a public, distributed blockchain, as well as about the catalysts for this trust, is based on a method of analysis and source criticism. “Just as interaction between functionally diverse subsystems is necessary for a system to adapt to changes in its environment and thus develop and persist, so is the interpenetration of different segments of social knowledge essential for its expansion and deepening.” (Hausner, 2020). I assume that in the long term, increasing the economic efficiency of the cybereconomy is associated with a transition from Limited Access Order (LAO) to Open Access Order (OAO). A double balance is necessary, i.e. the compatibility of the economic and socioeconomic order (Fiedor, 2023). This analysis can be incorporated into the field of research known as macrotokenomics or cryptoeconomics (Au & Power, 2018, p. 10; Szelągowska, 2022, p. 238) Macroeconomics is currently attempting to use modified meanings of traditional concepts to adequately describe new phenomena, with currency, trust, value and exchange taking on slightly different meanings in the digital economy, and with new concepts emerging, such as public and private key cryptography, peer-to-peer file sharing, distributed computing, blockchains, etc. Cryptoeconomics analyses the ways in which network participants cooperate, combining economics and cryptography.

The Influence of Technological, Economic, Political, Legal and other Social Factors on Trust in Blockchain Transactions

Technological and Economic Factors – Introductory Remarks

Technological factors in a distributed blockchain network (i.e. data encryption, inability to modify data without network consensus, user authentication without the need for trusted intermediaries) that catalyse trust are, according to the assumptions of its creators, tools ensuring cryptographic security, based on the adopted consensus mechanism (algorithm ensuring data consistency), transparency and clarity (everyone can verify the transaction history, each operation can be audited by each participant) (e.g. Schilke et al., 2023; Sharma et al. 2022; Shetty et al., 2019; Smits & Hulstijn, 2020; Toufaily & Zalan, 2024; Verhoest et al, 2024).

Consensus is the backbone of a fully decentralised blockchain. It results from achieving an agreement on the content of a transaction block among independent network nodes via an algorithm that ensures the security and immutability of data in a distributed system (Baranowski & Korczak, 2022). In other words, consensus is the process by which parties participating in a blockchain-based network agree to conduct a transaction, which is approved by all participants in that network. There are various algorithms used to achieve consensus.

The consensus mechanism enables the network to operate without a central authority to manage and control transactions, which is the key difference between transactions in regulated traditional markets and blockchain transactions. Instead of individuals representing institutions, i.e. traditional transaction validators (who can also be identified in centralised blockchains), automated systems operate to ensure data integrity. Nodes (computers in the network) independently verify transactions and reach agreements based on established consensus rules.

The most common validation mechanisms in distributed public blockchains are Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake (PoS). These mechanisms differ in structure, performance and attack resistance.

The Proof of Work (PoW) is a consensus mechanism in which computers compete to be the first to solve a complex mathematical puzzle. Proof of Work is performed by miners, who compete to create new blocks full of processed transactions, with the winner sharing the new block with the rest of the network and earning a newly minted token.

In the Proof of Stake (PoS), validators replace miners and are responsible for creating new blocks based on the number of tokens they hold. A validator is selected based on the number of staked tokens they hold, to create new blocks, share them on the network, and earn rewards.

The PoW mechanism guarantees a very high level of transaction security, while PoS networks provide higher transaction velocity. Bitcoin continues to utilise Proof of Work due to its exceptional attack resistance and high degree of decentralisation.

Various other consensus mechanisms are also being used and tested: Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), a variant of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) that introduces voting whereby network users elect delegates who manage the network and validate transactions on their behalf; Proof of Space (PoS), which requires network participants to provide proof of ownership of a specified amount of storage space on their devices; and Proof of Space Time (PoST), which requires participants to provide proof of ownership of a specified amount of storage space for a specified period of time.

In private blockchain networks, the use of Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) mechanisms is standard practice.

The economic factors that are the catalysts of trust in economic transactions – as envisioned by their creators – are the financial and praxeological effects of the above technology's application. These include lower transaction and operational costs than those in traditional businesses (low fees and increased cost predictability); high-speed processing of mass transactions; economic scalability (the ability to serve large numbers of customers); transparency; regularity; and stability in decision-making and execution of actions (guaranteed by network openness and smart contracts).

Blockchain decentralisation is generally presented as an advantage, but it can also be a challenge. The lack of a central governing body can hinder rapid decision-making in the event of issues such as security flaws or protocol updates, while governance processes in decentralised networks often require community votes, which can be time-consuming and lead to divisions. Furthermore, some consensus mechanisms can be at risk of centralisation. For example, in PoS, individuals with a larger number of tokens have a greater chance of becoming validators and receiving rewards, which can lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a few large players, weakening the decentralised nature of the network.

External Factors: Politics, Law and Other Social Phenomena

Trust in distributed network technology also depends on political, legal, as well as other social factors. These factors impact individuals who are already users of this technology (e.g. token owners, investors, users of token exchanges, programmers, and developers) differently than they impact non-users (e.g. those who are not interested in the blockchain ecosystem at all, who do not understand the technology, those who are interested but lack the knowledge, and professionals interested in modern technologies who act as intermediaries in traditional transactions: notaries, agents and clerks).

Politics, law and social phenomena can be (are) both catalysts for trust in blockchain transactions and its inhibitors (barriers). A catalyst accelerates events and processes, stimulating development and transformation, while an inhibitor blocks, slows, and limits the change.

Impact of Politics. What impact does politics have on the tokenisation of the economy? When does it catalyse trust in economic transactions on the blockchain, and when does it act as a barrier?

In democratic political systems, trust in public authorities has stagnated for years. Current social surveys (2024) indicate a significant (64%) level of distrust in traditional democratic practices.³ This significant trust gap creates a fertile ground for building a new space of economic trust – social faith in technology, codes, and algorithms. It is for this reason that many countries are monitoring this technology. Rather than ignoring it, they seek opportunities to use it to regain credibility. However, the level of political interest in this technology varies and is not stable in time.

In many industrialised countries, including the United States, a leading digital economy with a vast venture capital market that funds technology startups, blockchain policy is volatile. It fluctuates with the shifting political agendas after each election. Most countries around the world are observing the shifting American solutions, analysing the opportunities and threats of the blockchain revolution. They are also seeking ways to mitigate the threat of online crime, given the many untested tokenisation solutions and the lack of effective legal oversight. Democratic countries generally declare they would like to develop a supportive legal framework that also guarantees the resilience of this form of economy to illegal activities.

For now, only a few democratic countries have token-friendly regulations, e.g. Estonia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Portugal, Canada, Singapore and Switzerland (Szpringer, 2022, p. 198-206). Countries supporting distributed technologies build trust in this technology not only through direct investments, but also by funding scientific research, creating regulatory sandboxes (Bonca, 2025; Bonca & Jabłońska-Bonca, 2024), and implementing these solutions in public administration.

Autocratic, undemocratic states generally (although there are exceptions) strive to take direct and strict control over these technologies, strengthening bans and other economic regulations, and generally aiming at ordering the determination of the credibility of transactions using only their state agencies. Many of them prohibit any blockchain operations or investments in cryptocurrencies and other cryptographic assets, not only because of the threat of terrorism financing and money laundering, as well as the possibility of uncontrolled financial flows, but above all because of the potential loss of control over foundations for legal and financial oversight of the economy and investors.

The list of countries where Bitcoin and other tokens have been banned includes Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Egypt, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Nepal, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. As an example, the Supreme Court of China ruled in 2021 that "collecting so-called ‘virtual currencies’ such as Bitcoin and Ethereum by investors through the illegal issuance and circulation of tokens (...) is essentially an act of illegal public financing without permission. Therefore, no organisation or individual is permitted to engage in illegal token issuance and financial activities" (Dziadkowiec, 2024).

However, there are exceptions to this rule: two undemocratic countries recently did the opposite – Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates created friendly regulations. In March 2025, the United Arab Emirates decided to maintain land and mortgage registers directly on the blockchain, which is a public, centralised blockchain and a pilot programme, although its educational significance cannot be overstated. Over 3,000 investors (UAE residents) have already registered. The platform, based on the XRP Ledger and Ctrl Alt infrastructure, has been integrated with the Dubai Land Department (DLD, http), and by registering property deeds on the blockchain, every transaction is immediately verified and publicly visible, ensuring full transparency. Furthermore, every fractional ownership is digitally controlled and requires no intermediaries, giving investors a real sense of security. Significant disintermediation has become a reality in Dubai.

There's also a long list of countries that are not considered strong democracies and lack modern economic law, where intensive work is underway to organise control over the token economy. Indeed, investors in unstable countries with high inflation, bank failures, recessions, etc. highly value the ability to conduct transactions out of the sight, control and regulatory supervision of governments and law enforcement agencies.

There are also highly industrialised Western countries, where politicians still believe in the old industrial model of the economy. Germany is a case in point. "Mercantilists, old and new, view groundbreaking technologies with suspicion. They enjoy trading in material goods. A mercantilist mindset goes hand in hand with technophobia" (Munchau, 2024, p. 39). Many German politicians still hang on to “poor technological, geopolitical and economic solutions, as well as an economic philosophy that generally equated the economy with industry”, argues Wolfgang Munchau in his work: “Kaput. The end of the German miracle” (Munchau, 2024). German policy is struggling to support blockchain-related startups.

Banks also frequently express reluctance to embrace new technology (Fridgen et al., 2021). Suppressing innovations such as tokens is not only in the interest of political authorities in many countries that do not want to lose the traditional, centuries-old control function of the ‘trusted transaction intermediary’ and generator of this trust, but also in the interest of banks themselves (Marszałek, 2016). Banks often defend the status quo, reinforcing and petrifying existing business models, thereby protecting themselves from costly technological modifications and potential customer attrition. They are generally not open to blockchain startups and do not support venture capital in that space.

Global and local politics are shaped not only by states, but also by large corporations. Can one assume it is true that they are in fact assuming dominant control over security of the operating rules of new technologies? Will the economic and financial control of oligopolistic digital giants and large technology and financial corporates overwhelm that of states?

The foundations of trust in blockchain also rest on users' belief in the honesty of corporate funding of this technology and in the integrity of the network developers funded by these corporations. Regular, honest and cooperative behaviour is expected from computer scientists, mathematicians, statisticians, engineers, programmers and product managers working within these corporations to advance new technologies.

One cannot neglect the importance of the political and financial factor: how the cost of energy necessary to maintain and use the blockchain will be distributed between states and corporations, and how the issue of greenhouse gas emissions will be addressed.

Thus, political decisions by states, as well as the attitudes of corporations and banks regarding the endorsement of this form of business, have a direct impact on the foundations of investor trust in tokenisation and blockchain transactions. Technology operates in a certain environment, and therefore not only tech itself but also politics shape the foundations of trust in transactions. Political decisions can act as catalysts (e.g. the real estate registry on a public and centralised blockchain in the UAE) but also create barriers (legal prohibitions against Bitcoin) in shaping trust in blockchain.

Impact of Law. What impact does law, a basic form of political decision-making, have on trust in blockchain transactions? Since it is certain that both democratic and non-democratic states will not withdraw from control projects, the emerging law (or lack thereof) is an important factor in building or weakening the foundations of trust in tokens.

Social research conducted across 24 democratic countries in 2024 confirms that almost half of respondents had little trust in the law (45.2%), and 5.7% had no trust at all. This widespread distrust helps explain one of the reasons for the illusion that one can ‘escape from the law’ through codes, algorithms, and technology (ESS, 2024).

For now, criminal networks around the world, including espionage groups conducting various hybrid, politically motivated operations in foreign countries, have many opportunities to commit acts that undermine the security and credibility of the network. The idea of “escaping from the law”, imagined by some investors seeking to bypass state controls, rests on a myth. The law does not exempt anyone conducting transactions on blockchains from criminal, civil, financial or administrative liability. Legal facts exist, although it is true that it is currently often possible to hide from legal liability for some time, due to the anonymity of transactions and the lack of real control procedures and resources.

The opportunities for increased trust and the dynamic development of tokenisation are undermined by media-reported large-scale, predatory financial frauds, pyramid schemes, hacking attacks, attacks on memory pools, and cryptocurrency exchanges (Shetty et al., 2019). Politicians and lawyers lack effective strategies to quickly respond to such incidents.

At present, no country's legal system provides a comprehensive set of effective tools to protect the average consumer (investor) in a distributed network. For example, it does not guarantee non-discrimination, it does not create principles of good faith or good practices adapted to tokens, and it does not solve the problems of localising tax liabilities or legal liability for software errors (Szpringer, 2018 , p. 157-168; Szpringer, 2022).

Besides legislative uncertainty, dispute resolution between parties remains a challenge. Although transactions are conducted using self-executing smart contracts, errors can still occur - for example, during the smart contract design phase, when the code may be incomplete or incorrectly formulated. Errors may also arise in the conceptual design of the token model itself, or in the input data (contract parameter values), if they are entered inaccurately or have been uploaded with errors from external sources (e.g. transactional data delivered by a conventional bank).

Traditional courts are not equipped to handle the challenges that arise from the thousands of twenty-first-century token transactions taking place on the blockchain. Dispute resolution through traditional courts or even online arbitration is perceived as too slow, costly and burdened with excessively bureaucratic procedures, numerous legal restrictions related to specific jurisdictions, and complex national regulations, especially when dealing with the vast number of cross-border disputes in small-scale e-commerce, i.e. handling thousands of low-value claims across national borders. “The new economic reality includes a large number of small international claims worth a few thousand dollars in cases such as: a software development contract, a remote team that ran a crowdfunding campaign but failed to deliver what was promised, or an online fraud” (Ast & Nappert, 2025).

Modern administrative regulations that consider the tokenisation of the economy (e.g. regarding supervision and registration) are essential, and possibly also a modification of criminal laws, so that they can be effectively applied to cybercriminals (e.g. counteracting money laundering, terrorism financing, fraud or hacking). Updates are required to civil law (e.g. securities law, contracts, personal data protection, privacy rights, property, liability for damages, operation of trading platforms, etc.), as well as financial law (e.g. taxes, the exchange of cryptoassets for cash).

The European Union recently took an important step towards defining a legal framework for crypto-assets in Europe with the Regulation on the Market in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) that entered into force in 2023 (European Union, 2023), which governs the issuance of crypto-assets and the provision of services in the European Union. In June, the Polish Council of Ministers adopted a draft law on the crypto-assets market (deregulation bill) submitted by the Minister of Finance (Ciechoński, 2024; KPRM, 2025), which contains stringent provisions for supervision and investor protection by equipping the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) with appropriate resources.

Going further, futurologists predict that in the future, legal regulations will be similar to software – embedded in applications as a computer code. Will this code then become a key source of trust and guarantee the reliability of economic transactions?

Figure 3
Traditional Sources of Trust in Transactions

Source: author's own work.

Therefore, the legal framework of countries that are friendly to this technology will naturally act as a catalyst for its development, performing preventive, supervisory and repressive functions to effectively combat crime, while also fulfilling a development role by motivating and promoting innovation, and a protective role by fostering cooperation between entities in public and private networks. Existing law will be amended and extended with a new layer of regulation.

The traditional foundations of trust, for centuries formally based on the state and law, will not be significantly altered, but only be enriched with new content. Unfortunately, if the level of trust in the law remains low and unchanged, it will continue to undermine trust in blockchain. Public blockchain networks will not lead the cyberspace economy and society to a lasting paradigm shift in thinking about trust – that is, basing trust on faith in technology – until tight legal security mechanisms to counteract online crime are established.

Social Phenomena. Which social phenomena are catalysts and which are barriers to trust in blockchain transactions?

The vision of a stable, inviolable and anonymous blockchain is undoubtedly attractive to Western societies disappointed with the effectiveness of liberal democracy and neoliberal economic theory (Fiedor, 2023; Kołodko & Koźmiński, 2017). The ideas of automated allocation of goods free from state control, disintermediation (‘de-intermediation’)–that is, eliminating intermediaries such as public trust agencies in transactions-escaping state and bank oversight, and believing in the emergence of “alternative economic cyberspaces” are tempting for new generations. Those who believe in 21st-century technologies and technological freedom (Fridgen et al., 2021; Marszałek, 2016). These ideas are powerful catalysts for a new approach to trust in the economy.

In the 21st century, the governments of democratic states are perceived as significantly less effective and efficient since due to electronic media, the governed (societies) have become much better informed and more demanding in their expectations (Schwab, 2018, p. 91). The digital age and social media have crumbled many of the barriers, which traditionally protected the formal authority of public institutions.

Consumers, investors and developers began to seek trust in horizontal social relations, trying to bypass petrified, slow, expensive and bureaucratic public institutions. This was driven by many factors, including disappointment with the effectiveness of liberal democracy and neoliberal economic theory, the loss of trust in the financial system in 2008, and the revolt against unethical behaviour by banks (the Occupy Wall Street movement). Life abhors a vacuum. In 2008, the year of the global financial crisis, Sathoshi Nakamoto ‘stepped in’ with a text about Bitcoin. That year opened the eyes of investors on the one hand and organised crime on the other, demonstrating the possibilities offered by this invention (Beck et al., 2016). A social awakening of faith and trust in reliable, distributed and transparent technologies occurred, both among honest and dishonest individuals.

Blockchain networks began to emerge alongside other, unconventional forms of communication in cyberspace, called ‘alternative public spaces’. ‘Alternative economic cyberspaces’ began to emerge, and within them ‘e-circles of trust’ appeared. ‘Circles of trust’ are individuals (present online) who connect because they believe in shared values, in this case: privacy, anonymity, praxeological efficiency and technological freedom offered by blockchain technology. Blockchain users do not know each other personally and have no direct contact, with only technology and imagination connecting them and creating decentralised trust in the abstract economic cyberworld and its procedures (Sztompka, 2007, p. 105). In this way, a kind of economic counterculture is being created.

At the same time, the world of criminal subculture has become a dark obverse to the distinct ‘circles of trust’ of honest investors. Countercultures question the values, norms and sources of trust of traditional, official economic culture (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). The generation of ‘digital people’ (the so-called generation Me in sociological terms) in the 21st century believes not only in the honesty of ‘others within their circle’, but also in various expert systems. They are not concerned by the fact that the architecture, operating principles and internal organisation are completely unclear to most of them. This generation also has strong faith in its own digital skills (Giddens, 1984; Skinner, 2022).

European Social Survey 2024 results show that almost half (46.5%) of the population overwhelmingly trusts other people, which enables significant potential opportunities for trusting strangers and unknown investors using blockchain (ESS, 2024).

This is a trap because the belief in escaping from the state and the law, creating new foundations of trust that investors submit to, effectively obscures the significant financial risks and potential large-scale frauds present in blockchain networks. In reality, this refers to risks of abuse and loss of funds, while crypto-assets are characterised by high volatility of their value and lack of clear economic valuation. However, investors generally have a very high appetite for risk, a trait shared by criminals and agents of influence. They also tend to overestimate their digital skills, a tendency well documented in psychological research. The ‘self-valorisation’ to which they submit (especially among investors from generation Z) leads them to the illusion of being above average (Dunning-Kruger effect), which is a cognitive error (Lauria, 2024). Downplaying and failing to notice the problems of economic, legal and operational security by those investing in tokens (especially in bitcoins) opens the way to their own mistakes and the way to criminal activity (“Trust yourself, do not seek the intermediation of public institutions. After all, you have certainty thanks to faith in the reliability of technology” – say investors).

Cryptocurrency exchanges are not yet effectively supervised by the states, and legal regulations are fragmented with numerous loopholes. Investors in tokens and those transacting on the blockchain build trust based on many other selective, subjective and objective factors, including faith in the technology, in algorithms, in codes, in decentralised applications, and in the economic advantages of this technology. Simultaneously, it is also trust in the community, in the set of individual entities that collectively manage and operate the digital platform, and in the third parties (corporations) responsible for the creation of technological systems and data. All these elements are inter-connected, and feedback loops exist.

Token trading transactions are fully automated, transparent and secure, and require no intermediaries. The transactions themselves are unmediated, although there are many entities involved in the preparations (e.g. business analysts, lawyers, appraisers, system architects, token issuers, programmers, testers, marketing specialists, cryptocurrency exchanges) and the state, which expects investors to fulfil legal obligations (e.g. tax returns). Investors have tax obligations in their country of residence if they sell all their tokens and realise the profits from their sale or receive dividends, while the tax authorities always remain a third party in that ecosystem. And in the case of real estate transactions, a land and mortgage register (court) and notary are still required (Wach, 2022). Although investors buy tokens directly from the issuer or the other party to the transaction, the entire system is operated by an ecosystem of digital intermediaries who ensure the security, legality and functionality of the investment.

Investors trust other users and their own autonomous competences, believing that they will enter data into the network flawlessly, will always properly protect their asset access data, and that they will successfully navigate crypto-asset exchanges. They are not afraid of computer hacking, lost passwords or access codes. They establish a sense of trust in their consciousness, knowing that risks are no longer insured by state institutions, banks or private agencies. Disintermediation or the elimination of intermediaries (public trust agencies) in transactions and the removal of third parties poses a significant risk. In that environment, no one will call to confirm a transaction, no one will deal with a permanently lost private key, no one will take responsibility for a broken wallet (which serves as a digital repository), nor will anyone intervene when a payment dispute occurs because, for example, a purchased item is damaged (Szpringer, 2018 , p. 158).

Sources of trust beyond technology include a significant psychological factor: a strong belief in ‘self’ and ‘others’ – that is, a circle of unknown trustees, an attitude that is not required in traditional transactions. The social context of technology in the economy shapes the foundations of trust in transactions. Social trust (in ‘other anonymous users’), faith in oneself (autonomous competences), and belief in the many entities preparing tokens behind the scenes, the confidence in smart contracts, blockchain platforms, and exchanges strengthen the trust in transactions. Blockchain architecture has not eliminated the social and psychological factors of that trust.

Figure 4
Sources of Trust to Transactions on a Public, Decentralised Blockchain

Source: author's own work.

Conclusions

The tokenisation of the economy is changing the foundations of trust in transactions. Traditionally, trust in transactions arises from three main sources: 1) trust in intermediary institutions (e.g. banks, notaries, land and mortgage registers, real estate agents, law); 2) trust in the other party to the transaction (relational trust); and 3) trust in their reputation (reputational trust).

The sources of trust in transactions on a public distributed blockchain are different, and include: 1) trust in the technology - through consensus, cryptography, and the openness of the software system; and also 2) trust in the decentralised community, in the system's users who host the platform and ensure its effectiveness, hence trust in ‘others’ (social trust); 3) trust in the user himself (autonomous competence); and 4) trust in ‘hidden’ entities – experts developing the software: token models, smart contracts, blockchain platforms, etc.

Both in traditional and blockchain economies, the environment (politics, law and social phenomena) can modify these sources. These three factors are either catalysts or inhibitors of trust, which can alter the way this tool works.

Primarily, taking into account the political factor, trust in transactions on a distributed, public blockchain will grow if: 1) countries' economic policies related to innovation become more stable and predictable; 2) the idea of technological freedom is promoted by politicians; 3) policies support technological innovation through specific state initiatives (e.g. government pilot projects, grants, tax exemptions for blockchain projects, regulatory sandboxes); 4) international political and legal cooperation is formed to facilitate cross-border blockchain transactions and establish rules for cooperation between public and private entities; 5) political decision-making centres support open dialogue and cooperation between public and private stakeholders, which is necessary to solve problems related to the management of joint public and private projects; 6) political power centres are prepared to quickly and professionally respond to information crises related to crime and fraudulent activity on blockchains. If the media reveals further serious frauds, manipulations, collapses of cryptocurrency exchanges or money laundering scandals publicised in the media, they will be able to respond quickly, decisively and professionally.

Secondly, the law will catalyse trust in the token economy if: 1) the market is subjected to friendly, liberal administrative, financial and criminal regulations that reduce the risk of manipulation, fraud and money laundering on the blockchain; 2) international efforts are undertaken to establish global principles of legal cooperation between states in the token economy, which will reduce legal uncertainty; 3) smart contracts incorporate blockchain-based arbitration clauses. Such ‘distributed justice’ courts will automatically resolve disputes. In short, smart contracts will arbitrarily and automatically resolve the disputes by counting the votes of anonymous arbitrators and making decisions self-executable on the blockchain. State enforcement will be unnecessary.

Thirdly, the level of trust also depends on social and psychological phenomena, among which public awareness is an often underestimated pillar of trust in blockchain transactions. as knowledge about blockchain operations grows, so too will trust in the token economy. The following is necessary: 1) Systematic education by public and private institutions - the more people understand the basics of blockchain, the less likely myths and prejudices will spread (i.e. trainings, workshops, webinars and appropriately profiled educational programs in management, economics, law, sociology and psychology are necessary); 2) Systematic popularisation in the media, for example through positive coverage of DeFi project successes or public sector implementations; 3) Active implementation of blockchain projects by state institutions, banks, large corporations and startups, which strengthens the credibility and trust in the technology itself in the eyes of the public.

The above steps will support the tokenisation of the economy.

On the other hand, these mechanisms can block themselves. For example, some consensus mechanisms (e.g. PoS or DPoS) on a decentralised blockchain carry potential risks of centralisation. In PoS, users with a larger number of tokens have a greater chance of becoming validators. Since rewards are awarded proportionally to the amount of cryptocurrencies staked, users with large token holdings can systematically increase their holdings, which can lead to user inequality within the ecosystem. In DPoS, on the other hand, there is a risk of centralisation of power in the hands of a few delegates, while in Proof of Authority (PoA), there is a risk of centralisation of power in the hands of a few influences. Authorised nodes can abuse their position, for example by censoring transactions, which in turn violates the principles of decentralisation and trust. Corruption is also possible.

In the long run – if the entire blockchain concept fails (e.g. because its large-scale implementation is too expensive, using the blockchain is not free, hardware failures are possible, one has to pay to run applications on them, transactions and computing power have a very high price, etc.) – very complex economic, financial, managerial, legal and IT issues will need to be addressed. Nakamoto's (2008) novel form of trust – completely anonymous and decentralised ‘permissionless consensus’ without any support from government or trusted intermediaries – is ingenious but expensive, and indeed not free from intermediaries working behind the scenes. A detailed economic analysis of the costs was recently conducted by Eric Budish (Budish, 2025, p. 113).

Optimists and proponents of technological determinism predict rapid and widespread development of tokenisation for various assets. They believe that well-structured, loophole-free, effective and yet user-friendly standards for state oversight of blockchain, effectively combatting crime, will soon emerge. Investors will appreciate the benefits of tokens even more than they do today, trusting blockchain for technological and economic reasons. For now, however, the only certainty is that blockchain technology disrupts traditional business models and is very expensive, while criminals remain one step ahead of regulators.

The second, more modest vision depicts a hybridisation of economic structures and rules. Traditional principles of trust in the state, law and banks as guarantors of transaction security will be complemented in by the aforementioned additional principles of trust shaping the economy. Consensus among blockchain participants, decentralisation, transparency, data immutability and openness – and therefore technical structure, economic advantages, and social trust – will also be recognised as guarantees of transaction security.

Trust institutions, both old and new, will share responsibilities according to the type of transaction, with the foundations of trust drawn from multiple sources and at multiple levels. This perspective emerges as the most likely from the above analysis of the influencing factors, as trust in technology is not solely a matter of technology, but is deeply embedded in the context of politics, legal and social culture.

A radical position is also being expressed that this path is too expensive and risky, and therefore not worth investing in. Many scientists do not rule out that the industry could collapse. For example, Melanie Swan claims that: “There is a certain probability that the entire blockchain industry will simply collapse (either due to already anticipated problems or for other, as yet unknown reasons)” (Swan, 2020, p. 158).

Futurology in the social sciences is a highly uncertain approach. The infinite series of causes behind the fall or rise of confidence in the token market and blockchain may not originate in the present–or even in the past–but in a moment that is yet to come. This makes forecasting inherently risky, as the industry is still at an early stage of development and faces numerous limitations.

However, should the blockchain revolution succeed, leading to a truly broad redefinition of business models, with the economy largely focused on applying new principles of trust, what could be achieved? Blockchain would become more than just a groundbreaking new information and communication technology (Szpringer & Niewińska, 2021).

Trust in a distributed ledger will complement traditional sources of trust, and in some aspects ‘free’ entities from tying investments to the territory of the state. An advantage of tokenisation is the possibility of global activity, i.e. increased liquidity and availability of investments, allowing for easier entry into the market, especially for smaller investors. The transparency of the code will ensure that no one makes changes to its structure. However, this does not mean the removal of legal control of states and the law, and will not eliminate the socio-psychological factors of building trust nor the need to solve problems of dividing legal and financial responsibility between large corporations and the state, including dividing the costs of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. Disputes will not cease to exist, but will continue to be resolved by traditional courts or alternative e-arbitration courts that will operate on the blockchain. Taxes will continue to be collected, licenses will be created, and audits will be carried out. Some public institutions that currently guarantee trust and security (e.g. land and mortgage courts, banks) will limit and change their tasks.

The future depends not on the ideas and will of individual investors or the organisation of crypto-asset exchanges, but on global strategic decisions-particularly those concerning the financing of technological development, and the interest and investment of governments, large corporations, non-profit organisations, and other financial institutions. It will also depend on the engagement of sectors such as healthcare, media, real estate and energy, which are seeking new solutions to security problems in distributed systems. Key factors in transforming business models to incorporate blockchain operations include solutions for energy efficiency, lower transaction costs, and the work of programmers and legislators related to translating legal regulations into coding algorithms, a task that appears to be incredibly difficult.

The utopian idea that the individualistic ‘self-valorisation’ of investors themselves and their faith in technology (“I trust technology more than people”) will win as the only source of trust is an obvious error in reasoning. We need to recognise the overt and hidden forces behind blockchain, not submit to the illusions of anarchists and libertarians about self-organising societies and the vision of a fully cryptographic economic system. An image of the economy in which young generations of investors entrust assets to the anonymous blockchain infrastructure, i.e. entities without names (‘no name’), and the basis for trust in transactions is mainly the belief in the lack of errors in the ‘black box’ of the technology, faith in oneself and in anonymous colleagues can be classified as magical realism. The digital world is the world of the laws of physics, mathematics, computer science, cryptography, but also the social world: politics, law and people and their knowledge, competences and emotions: computer scientists, mathematicians, statisticians, engineers, programmers and product managers working in these corporations.

This far-reaching hypothesis has no chance of being realised, as states will continue to develop oversight and legal control over blockchain activities. Rather than diminishing the importance of state authority for the security of blockchain transactions, new technologies will instead foster a new, hybrid, multi-layered type of trust. Politics, law and public awareness, alongside technology, will serve as the foundations of trust in transactions.

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